STONE v. PHILBROOK: ANOTHER WORD
ON THREE-JUDGE COURTS AND
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
The federal three-judge court statutes' come into play when
injunctive relief from the enforcement of a state or federal statute or a state regulation is sought on federal constitutional
grounds. The ostensible purpose of these statutes is to protect
state and federal programs from paralysis by the action of "one
little federal judge."' 2 Courts, however, have construed these
statutes inconsistently: some decisions have denied the protection of the statutes to those they were intended to aid, while
others have extended protection to those they were not intended
to aid.3 Two outstanding features of the statutes have produced
these results. First, in the cases in which the statutes are applicable, a court of three judges must be convened whether or not the
state or federal defendant whose program is challenged requests
it. Because these statutes, as presently construed, are jurisdictional in nature, a single judge is always incompetent to decide a'
1 28 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 2281-84 (1970). The texts of the two sections most important
for this Comment follow:
28 U.S.C. § 2281:
An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement,
operation or execution of any state statute by restraining the action of any
officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an
order made by an administrative board or commission acting under State
statutes, shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof upon the
ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a district court of three judges under section
2284 of this title.
28 U.S.C. § 1253:
Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an
interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding
required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district
court of three judges.
28 U.S.C. § 2284 prescribes the procedural steps to be taken upon receipt of a
complaint requiring a three-judge court.
2 45 CONG. REC. 7256 (1910) (remarks of Senator Overman).
3
See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND
WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 962-75 (2d ed. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as HART AND WECHSLER]; Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in ConstitutionalLitigation, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1964).
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case which must be determined by three judges.4 Second, review

of orders of three-judge courts granting or denying injunctions
is by mandatory appeal to the Supreme Court, without inter-

mediate review. These two features have motivated the courts to
narrow the range of cases to which the statutes apply and the
range of actions within a case that must be taken by a court of

three judges. 5
A stable body of law has not yet evolved. Questions concern-

ing when a three-judge court must be convened and what actions6
a single judge may take are still unsettled. In Stone v. Philbrook

the Second Circuit, speaking through Judge Henry Friendly,7
considered the limits of single-judge jurisdiction where both de-

claratory and injunctive remedies are sought. The court con-

cluded that a single judge has the jurisdiction to decide the case
as long as he grants only declaratory relief and that the single
judge has power to abstain on remand.
I.

STONE V. PHILBROOK

8

In Stone a Vermont recipient of General Assistance challenged the validity under the Federal Constitution of the regulations of Vermont's Department of Social Welfare in a suit against
4 E.g., Ex parte Metropolitan Water Co., 220 U.S. 539 (1911) (three judges needed
to deny injunction as well as to grant it). This case states that the three-judge statutes
are jurisdictional. Id. at 545.
5 Five ways in which three-judge court jurisdiction and associated appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court have been limited are: (1) narrowing the definition of attack
upon a state statute, e.g., Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246 (1941); Rorick v. Board
of Comm'rs, 307 U.S. 208, 212 (1939) (statute must be of statewide application before
requiring three judges); (2) narrowing the definition of unconstitutionality which will
support the call for a three-judge court, Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965)
(supremacy clause claims do not require three-judge courts); (3) dropping the requirement of three judges in cases when unconstitutionality is clear under prior decisions,
Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962) (a de jure segregation case; perhaps a procedural anomaly); (4) limiting the types of orders appealable to the Supreme Court,
e.g., Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90 (1974) (dismissal of
complaint for lack of standing by three-judge court must be appealed to court of appeals); Schackman v. Arnebergh, 387 U.S. 427 (1967) (per curiam) (refusal to convene
three-judge court appealable to court of appeals) (note that if the refusal is wrong, a
subsequent dismissal is effectively a denial of an injunction in a case required to be
heard by three judges); and (5) limiting the types of relief which can be granted only by
three-judge courts, see notes 18-30 infra & accompanying text for cases distinguishing,
for the purpose of the three-judge court statutes, claims for declaratory and injunctive
relief, an issue in the case under discussion in this Comment.
6 528 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir. 1975).
7 Judge Friendly's opinions on other issues of federal court jurisdiction have often
proved influential. See, e.g., Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969); T.B. Harms
Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964).
8 528 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir. 1975).
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the Commissioner of the Department. He attacked the regulations as unconstitutional for failing to provide for a "trial-type"
hearing before termination of assistance. 9 In his complaint plaintiff Stone requested both declaratory and injunctive relief.' 0
Stone moved for certification of the suit as a class action and
for summary judgment without specifying the type of relief he
sought under the motion. After considering the Commissioner's
affidavits in opposition, the single district judge granted both
motions:
[T]he plaintiff's motion for class action certification is
granted with respect to those receiving General Assistance three or more times per month. The plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment is granted as the Court
finds and declares the State's policy of denying evidentiary hearings to regular recipients of General Assistance, as defined in this opinion, to be unconstitutional. 1
After the judgment, the defendant raised for the first time
the three-judge requirement of section 2281 of Title 28 and
moved that the district judge vacate his order for lack of jurisdiction. The judge denied the motion without explanation.' 2 The
defendant appealed to the court of appeals both from the district judge's finding that he had jurisdiction and from the order
declaring that the regulations as applied to regular recipients of
General Assistance were unconstitutional.
On the jurisdictional issue, the court of appeals held both
that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the single-judge
district court and that the single judge had jurisdiction to decide
the case as he did. The court based its holding on a finding that
"what the district court entered was a declaratory judgment, not
13
an injunction.1
On the merits the court then concluded that the regulations
were constitutional.14 Plaintiff also raised before the court of
9

1d. at 1085. The regulations required "new" applications for General Assistance
each week, including evidence of 20 hours' effort to find full or part-time employment.
10Id. at 1086. Stone was an intervenor; the suit of the original plaintiff was dismissed. It is not clear what relief the original plaintiff in the suit had sought; even if he
had sought only declaratory relief, the suit became one for injunctive relief when Stone
was allowed to intervene.
1 Id. at 1087-88.
12Id. at 1088.
13Id.

14Id. at 1091.
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appeals, however, the question whether the Commissioner exceeded his statutory authority by issuing these regulations. Despite the fact that this problem was raised for the first time on
appeal, Judge Friendly held that it had "sufficient merit" to be
considered on remand. 15 After a brief review of the problem,
however, Judge Friendly concluded that it was a "delicate ques6
tion of state law" best considered by Vermont's own courts.'
The court of appeals therefore vacated the order granting class
action status and summary judgment to the plaintiff and ordered the district judge to abstain and to retain jurisdiction of
the case while the parties sought
determination of the state law
7
question in the state courts.'
15 Id.

16Id. at 1094.
17Id.

In abstaining, the court relied on Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496
(1941). Pullman indicates that abstention-retaining jurisdiction of the federal questions
in a case while directing the parties to seek a determination of state law questions in
state court-is appropriate in cases in which there is both an unclear question of state
law and a "substantial constitutional issue" which might be avoided by decision of the
state law issue. 312 U.S. at 498-500. See Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The
Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071, 1088 (1974). The two
basic policies served by abstention are (1) avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions,
and (2) avoiding the possible disruption of state programs by federal error in deciding
a state law issue. See id. 1083-1 101.
In Stone, however, the constitutional question was not overly difficult. In fact, the
court of appeals dealt with it rather summarily, holding the regulations clearly constitutional. Abstention to avoid an unnecessary constitutional decision is not appropriate if
the constitutional question is neither difficult nor unsettling. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); Field, supra, at 1096-1101.
If there were other reasons to retain jurisdiction of the case, the alternate policy of
abstention, avoiding disruption of state programs, might favor leaving the question of
state law to the state courts, especially after the court of appeals found the state law
question genuinely difficult and unsettled.
In Stone, however, the court not only indicated that the constitutional question was
easy but also held that if the regulations were authorized by state statute, they were
constitutional, thereby leaving no constitutional issue to avoid. In abstaining, the court
relied on County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959), an eminent
domain case in federal court under diversity jurisdiction that involved the issue of abstention when there was no constitutional question to avoid. The Court held that abstention in such a case "can be justified ... only in the exceptional circumstances where
the order to the parties to repair to the state court would clearly serve an important
countervailing interest." 360 U.S. at 188-89. Unable to find such an interest in Mashuda,
the Court affirmed the court of appeals' reversal of the district court's decision to abstain.
The citation of Mashuda in Stone is particularly noteworthy because the court does
not mention Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959),
another eminent domain case under diversity jurisdiction, decided the same day as
Mashuda, in which there was no constitutional question, but in which the Supreme
Court permitted the district court to abstain. Thibodaux has been read to allow abstention in cases in which only one of the two interests protected by Pullman abstention,
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DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS AND INJUNCTIONS

A.

The Distinction Between Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief in Three-Judge Court Cases
The jurisdictional question in Stone did not center on
whether the court of appeals could hear the case. Even if the
single judge did not have jurisdiction to enter his order, the
court of appeals had the power on review to order the judge to
request a three-judge court.1 8 To reach the merits of the district
court decision, however, the court of appeals had to hold also
that the single district judge acted within his jurisdiction in
granting Stone's motion for summary judgment. 19 In holding
that a single judge has jurisdiction to enter a declaratory judgment in a case in which the plaintiff seeks both declaratory and
injunctive relief, the court of appeals went beyond earlier declaratory judgment cases.
avoiding the disruption of a state program, is implicated. E.g., United Servs. Life Ins.
Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1964); cf. Phillips,
Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 515-16 (2d Cir. 1973)
(Friendly, J.). Such a reading, however, would undermine Pullman. Since Thibodaux,
the Supreme Court has indicated that abstention under Pullman requires a constitutional question. E.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375-78 (1964). Thibodaux has been
interpreted as a separate category of abstention requiring factors in addition t9 the
possibility of avoiding disruption of a state program. See Field, supra, at 1148-53.
The court's abstaining in Stone, then, after reaching the constitutional question,
could be explained under a broad reading of Pullman (perhaps taking Thibodaux and
Mashuda as modifying Pullman) which would allow abstention without a constitutional
question, or under a reading of Mashuda and Thibodaux as a separate category of abstention. By the latter interpretation the court in Stone held that avoiding disruption of
a state welfare program and, in particular, avoiding interference with a state's regulating the overall funding level of such a program, represent the kind of "important countervailing interest" which justifies abstention without a constitutional question. See Field,
supra, at 1096-1101, 1148-53.
In addition, once the court of appeals in Stone reached the federal question that
gave the court jurisdiction and decided it adversely to the plaintiff, it became appropriate for the court to use its discretion to decline pendent jurisdiction of the state law
question under United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966): The court
had disposed of the federal question quickly, the case had not moved to trial but was
decided at the summary judgment stage, the state law question would involve a difficult
issue and perhaps lengthy proceedings, and the plaintiff had failed to argue the state
law question until the court of appeals. In fact, because the court ordered abstention
only after reaching the federal question, unless advantages to the federal injunctive or
declaratory relief procedures existed which were not identified in the case, dismissal of
the pendent claim without prejudice, which would allow the plaintiff to bring a single
suit in state court to decide the state law claim, would have been the preferable course.
11 Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715-16 (1962);
Schackman v. Arnebergh, 387 U.S. 427 (1967); see Currie, supra note 3, at 66-76.
' 528 F.2d at 1089. Otherwise the court of appeals should have vacated and remanded for consideration by a three-judge court.
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The court correctly traced the doctrine that three judges
need not hear.a suit for declaratory relief to its origins in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez.2 ° In that case the plaintiff sought only
declaratory relief throughout the entire case. Although the
plaintiff included a prayer for injunctive relief in one amended
complaint, "neither the parties nor the judge at any relevant
time regarded the action as one in which injunctive relief was
'2 1
material to the disposition of the case."
Mendoza-Martinez explicitly stopped short, however, of holding that no request for declaratory relief alone was to be considered the same as a request for an injunction, and in fact
implied that in some cases the two should be treated identically:
Whether an action solely for declaratory relief
would under all circumstances be inappropriate for
consideration by a three-judge court we need not now
decide, for it is clear that in the present case the congressional policy underlying the statute was not frustrated by trial before a single judge. The legislative history of § 2282 and of its complement, § 2281, requiring
three judges to hear injunctive suits directed against
federal and state legislation, respectively, indicates that
these sections were enacted to prevent a single federal
judge from being able to paralyze totally the operation
of an entire regulatory scheme, either state or federal,
by issuance of a broad injunctive order. ...
The present action, which in form was for declaratory relief and which in its agreed substance did
not contemplate injunctive relief, involves none of the
dangers to which Congress was addressing itself. The
relief sought and the order entered affected an Act of
Congress in a totally noncoercive fashion. There was no
interdiction of the operation at large of the statute. It
was declared unconstitutional, but without even an injunctive sanction against the application of the statute
by the Government to M(ndoza-Martinez. Pending review in the Court of Appeals and in this Court, the
Government has been free to continue to apply the
22
statute.
20 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
21 Id. at 154.
22Id. at 154-55 (footnote omitted).
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In Rockefeller v. Catholic Medical Center,2 3 the Supreme Court
used language extending Mendoza-Martinez to declaratory relief
generally. On its facts, Rockefeller should have been decided on
other principles clearly enunciated in earlier cases; 2 4 nonetheless, it became the first precedent for the proposition that no
declaratory judgments are equivalent to injunctions for the purposes of the three-judge court statutes. In Rockefeller and subsequent cases up to Steffel v. Thompson,2 5 on which the Stone court
relied, however, the question was whether the Supreme Court or
the court of appeals had appellate jurisdiction over a three-judge
court's order granting declaratory relief.2 6 The jurisdiction of
397 U.S. 820 (1970) (per curiam).
The plaintiff in Catholic Medical Center v. Rockefeller, 305 F. Supp. 1256 (interim memorandum), memorandum granting declaratory relief issued, 305 F. Supp. 1268
(E.D.N.Y. 1969), vacated and remanded with instructions to enter a new orderfor review in the
court of appeals, 397 U.S. 820 (1970), sought a preliminary injunction against, 305 F.
Supp. at 1260, and declaratory relief from, a New York statute on the grounds that it
violated Title XIX of the Social Security Act and the fourteenth amendment. A threejudge court, convened because of the latter claim, addressed the supremacy clause claim
(Social Security Act overrides state statute) first, holding the state law inconsistent with
the federal and therefore invalid. Id. at 1271. The court issued declaratory relief on this
ground, denied the injunction, and stated that it was unnecessary to reach the constitutional issue. Id. The deciding factor barring direct Supreme Court review should have
been that the defendant appealed a decision based on only statutory or supremacy
clause grounds. Such decisions do not entitle a litigant to direct review. Swift & Co. v.
Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965). Perhaps Justice Douglas recognized this when he concurred only in the result, 397 U.S. at 820.
It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court announced this apparent distinction between all declaratory judgments and all injunctions in a per curiam memorandum in
a case which could have been decided the same way on another, well-established ground.
25 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
2'6
The subsequent cases on which the Stone court relied are Mitchell v. Donovan,
23
24

398 U.S. 427 (1970) (per curiam), Gunn v. University Comm., 399 U.S. 383 (1970), and
Thoms v. Heffernan, 473 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
418 U.S. 908 (1974).
In Mitchell the Supreme Court found that plaintiff had been denied declaratory
relief only (a request for an injunction had been properly dismissed as moot). Therefore, no request for an injunction had been granted or denied, and appeal lay solely to
the court of appeals.
In Gunn a three-judge district court, convened at plaintiff's request to consider his
complaint that the Texas "disturbing the peace" statute was unconstitutional, held that
plaintiff was entitled to the declaratory and injunctive relief he sought. The court, however, stayed its mandate until the end of the next session of the Texas legislature to
give the state an opportunity to pass a new statute, and retained jurisdiction. 399 U.S.
at 386. The Supreme Court dismissed the state's direct appeal for lack of jurisdiction,
concluding that an injunction had not been ordered (and that plaintiff had not appealed the denial), id. at 388-90, but indicating in addition that the district court had
not issued any final order, and that no appeal was available in any court until the
district court took reviewable "formal action." Id. at 380 n.6.
Only Justice White, in his concurring opinion joined by Justice Brennan, clearly
stated that the district court's opinion should be treated "as having the operative effect
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the district court was not at issue in any of these cases. Three
judges had been convened, and the district court therefore
would have had jurisdiction to grant an injunction. In Stone,
however, the question was whether a single judge, faced with a
request for both declaratory and injunctive relief, has jurisdiction to grant only the former.
The Stone court relied upon Steffel v. Thompson 2 7 for its holding that a single judge can grant declaratory relief. In Steffel
plaintiff challenged a Texas criminal trespass statute, and a
single judge denied both declaratory and injunctive relief.2 8 On
his appeal to the Fifth Circuit, however, plaintiff abandoned his
claim for an injunction and appealed only from the denial of
declaratory relief.29 Reviewing the court of appeals' affirmance,
the Supreme Court stated:
Since the complaint had originally sought to enjoin
enforcement of the state statute on grounds of unconstitutionality, a three-judge district court should have
been convened.... A three-judge court.., is normally
required even if the decision is to dismiss under
Younger-Samuels principles, since an exercise of discretion will usually be necessary ....But since petitioner's
request for injunctive relief was abandoned on appeal
...and only a request for declaratory relief remained,
the Court of Appeals did not err in exercising jurisdiction over the appeal. 30
of a declaratory judgment." Id. at 391 (White, J., concurring).
In Thorns the Second Circuit applied the Gunn holding to a case in which three

judges, convened to consider a request for both injunctive and declaratory relief from
the enforcement of Connecticut's flag desecration statute, entered a final order declar-

ing that the statute was unconstitutional, but decided to forbear from the issuance of an
injunction. The court of appeals held it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the
grant of only declaratory relief.
In both Gunn and Thorns those appealing the orders of the three-judge courts were
state defendants, so that even if those orders were construed as denying injunctions, the
appealing parties would have no right to direct Supreme Court review. Gunn v. Uni-

versity Comm., supra at 390 n.5.
27 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
2
8I. at 456.
29 Becker v. Thompson, 459 F.2d 919, 921 (5th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
30415 U.S. at 457 n.7. "Younger-Samuels principles" are those controlling the jurisdiction of a federal court to interfere with state criminal prosecutions. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971). The requirement that a
dismissal under these principles can only be made by three judges may have been
superseded by MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U.S. 799 (1975). See notes 58-63 infra & accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court gave no further reason for holding that the
court of appeals had jurisdiction. In order to reach the Steffel
result, however, the Court must have been saying that the court
of appeals had jurisdiction over this appeal of the denial of declaratory relief alone because a single judge (whose decision
would be appealable only to that court) would have had jurisdiction over a claim for declaratory relief alone. The court of appeals in Stone thought that its decision followed naturally from
Steffel:
If a court of appeals has jurisdiction in a case where a
single judge has taken action that could properly be
taken only by three judges, provided that the appellant
limits himself to action which the single judge could
properly have taken, it would seem to follow a fortiori
that the court of appeals has jurisdiction when a single
judge has only taken action he could properly take,
even though he was asked to take action he could not
properly take and made no disposition of the request to
3
do more. '
Yet Steffel does not dictate the result reached in Stone. The
peculiar fact situation of Steffel, in which plaintiff abandoned
his claim for injunctive relief, makes the case similar to
Mendoza-Martinez in that it can be treated as if the plaintiff
sought only declaratory relief from the beginning. If the case is
viewed in retrospect in that posture, the single judge could
''properly" have taken action on the only element remaining in
the case. Under this view Steffel was a case in which lower court
jurisdiction was "patched up" in retrospect.
Viewing the case differently, Judge Friendly perhaps
thought that Stone followed a fortiori from Steffel because he
believes jurisdiction cannot be patched up retrospectively: traditionally an appellate court has no jurisdiction over the merits of
an appeal from a court with no jurisdiction. 32 Under this view,
for Steffel to have been decided on the merits, the single judge
must have had jurisdiction to deny declaratory relief while the
request for an injunction was pending. If no distinction exists
31 528 F.2d at 1089 (footnote omitted).
32 E.g., Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934) ("An appellate federal court
must satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also of that of the lower courts in
a cause under review." (footnote omitted)); Becker Transp. Co. v. Department of Pub.
Util., 314 Mass. 522, 527, 50 N.E.2d 817, 820 (1943) (labeling this proposition "elementary").
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between grants and denials of relief in three-judge law,33 the
single judge in Stone must have had power to grant declaratory
relief as well. 34
If one accepts the premise that in rare cases jurisdiction
can be patched up, however, two possible ways of distinguishing
Steffel from Stone emerge. The first is to say that Steffel-patching
did not occur in Stone because at all relevant times plaintiff
Stone, unlike Steffel, sought injunctive as well as declaratory
relief; that he did not seek injunctive relief on appeal is irrelevant, because he was appellee, and did not seek anything. When
Steffel reached the court of appeals, only a suit for declaratory
relief remained; in Stone, even in retrospect, a suit remained for
both declaratory and injunctive relief over which a single judge
would not have had jurisdiction.3 5 Second, even if Steffelpatching theoretically could have been employed in Stone, it
should not have been, because it would have paved the way for
judicial subversion of the three-judge court statutes. 6
Once Steffel is thus distinguished from Stone, it is seen that to
assume that the single judge could "properly" grant declaratory
relief when also faced with a claim for injunctive relief, just
because he could act if faced with a request for declaratory relief
alone, is to assume away the primary issue of Stone: whether a
single judge currently faced with a claim for injunctive relief
lacks jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief.
B. Single Judge's Ability to Avoid Three-Judge
Requirement by GrantingDeclaratoryRelief
The holding in Mendoza-Martinez3 7 that suits requesting only
declaratory relief do not require three judges or direct review
represents, as the court in Stone emphasizes, the principal step in
the "significant subversion" of the policy of the three-judge statutes to protect states from the improvident actions of single
judges. One possible reading of Stone, however, would extend
33 See Ex parte Metropolitan Water Co., 220 U.S. 539 (1911).
34 This would be true even if one of the parties had requested a three-judge court.
The court in Stone, however, indicated that its holding might not extepd to a case in
which "state defendants made a timely request for a three-judge court." 528 F.2d at
1090. For a discussion of the court's view of the effect of a timely request for a threejudge court, see notes 39-47 infra & accompanying text.
35 After the Second Circuit reverses and remands, Stone's surviving complaint presumably asks for both injunctive and declaratory relief.
" Notes 37-47 infra & accompanying text.
37 372 U.S. 144 (1963); see Rockefeller v. Catholic Medical Center, 397 U.S. 820
(1970).
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the subversion significantly further by allowing not only the
plaintiff, but also the single judge, to control his jurisdiction to
hear the case: if a timely request for a three-judge court by
defendants would not have deprived the single judge of jurisdiction to order declaratory relief for Stone, then the single judge
may control his own jurisdiction by entering a declaratory judgment rather than an injunction. This also differentiates Stone
from the earlier cases in which a three-judge district court determined merely the course of appellate review by acting only on
the request for declaratory relief; in those cases three judges
rather than one made the original determination of the statute's
validity, as the statutory policy requires. What makes the elimination of the intended protection to the state particularly significant is that the holding in Stone would only apply in cases where
the state lost, because a decision denying the plaintiff declaratory relief would also deny him injunctive relief, and thus could
only be made by a three-judge court.
The policy of protecting the state against single-judge decisions may already have been weakened by Hagans v. Lavine.38 In
Hagans the Court held that when a single judge is faced with a
claim for injunctive relief on both statutory and constitutional
grounds, he may avoid, by deciding against the state only on the
nonconstitutional question, both the constitutional issue and the
necessity for convening a three-judge court. On the other hand,
the Stone approach set out above allows a single judge at his
discretion to make a ruling against the state on constitutional
grounds without calling a three-judge court.
That the court in Stone recognized the jurisdictional difficulties of the single judge's acting in this way is indicated by its
observation that it was "not here dealing with a case where state
defendants made a timely request for a three-judge court."3 9
Raising the issue of the "timeliness" of the request suggests that
the three-judge requirement might be waivable. The court supported this interpretation of the statute by indicating that
whether either party asked for a three-judge court is significant
in deciding whether the district judge had power to hear the
case: "It is plain enough that if either party had requested the
convening40 of a three-judge court, the request should have been
'
granted.
38 415 U.S. 528 (1974); see Murrow v. Clifford, 502 F.2d 1066 (3d Cir. 1974).

39 528 F.2d at 1090.
40
1d. at 1088.
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The court avoided specifying whether the single judge
would have lost jurisdiction to enter his order for solely declaratory relief if a timely request for a court of three judges had
been made. 4 1 If so, the three-judge statutes are nonjurisdictional
(waivable) to the extent that they protect the parties from single
judge decisions on requests for declaratory relief appended to
requests for injunctions. 42 This waivability makes sense if no decisions granting only declaratory judgments are directly appeal43
able to the Supreme Court regardless of the relief requested; if
a case is not of a nature requiring direct review, the statutes do
not indicate that it is of a nature requiring three judges. If Stone
is read this way, then the parties, but not the single judge himself, can influence the decision whether or not to convene a
three-judge court. This of course raises the possibility of a much
broader waivability of these statutes. If neither party feels the
need for the protection of three judges and of direct review,
then the logic here would suggest that only one judge should be
required. If we accept the view that the statutes were enacted to
protect the states from single-judge action, then the states alone
should be able to waive the protection.4 4 Either of these45 results
would be a significant change from current procedures.
If, however, a timely request for three judges would not
have deprived the single judge of jurisdiction to enter declaratory relief, then the court is extending dramatically the possibilities for "subversion"46 of the three-judge statutes by giving
41

Id.

If this theory is true, the single judge obtained jurisdiction to enter declaratory
relief by the parties' waiver of the three-judge provision.
43Text accompanying notes 18-30 supra.
44See, e.g., Offermann v. Nitkowski, 378 F.2d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 1967); AMERICAN LAW
42

INSTITUTE,
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FEDERAL

331 (1969); Currie, supra note 3, at 76-77.
45 The language of the statute indicates that a single district judge must request a
three-judge court on his own initiative, regardless of the requests of the 'parties. 28
U.S.C. §§ 2281-82, 2284(1) (1970). The decisions also indicate that (at least wherever
there is a live request for an injunction) the statute is jurisdictional and nonwaivable. See
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Currie, supra note 3, at 76-77.
The suggestion of general waivability made in the text is of course a great extension of what Judge Friendly may be proposing in Stone, where he explicitly distinguished the case at bar, in which the district judge granted only declaratory relief, from
"a case where injunctive relief had been granted [by one judge] after failure to ask for a
three-judge court." 528 F.2d at 1090 (citing Crow v. California Dep't of Human Resources 325 F. Supp. 1314 (1970), rev'd, 490 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1973), vacated and renandedfor considerationof moolness and ifnot moot for considerationof three-judge requirement,
420 U.S. 917 (1975)).
46 528 F.2d at 1090.
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4
the single judge power to avoid them at his discretion. 1
Thus, both possible readings of Stone take it beyond existing
precedent, but, depending on the reading, different groups may
be expected to benefit. If the first reading is adopted, threejudge protection would remain available for those who want it,
but litigants would gain some ability to dispense with it. The
extent of this flexibility would depend on whether and how far
Stone is extended. If the second reading is adopted, the single
judge would gain a large measure of ability to control litigation
at the expense of the wishes of a party desiring three-judge
protection. This result may be acceptable to those who oppose
the three-judge legislation in its entirety, but it contains obvious
potential for abuse.

III.

WHEN

Is

"DECLARATORY RELIEF" ONLY

DECLARATORY RELIEF?

The declaratory relief granted in Stone produced the exact
circumstances which the Supreme Court in MendozaMartinez-its only full consideration of the equivalence of injunctions and declaratory relief for purposes of the three-judge court
statutes-indicated might dictate treating declaratory relief like
an injunction. Because the single district court judge in Stone had
granted class action status, the declaratory judgment was formally binding on Vermont for all recipients who, like Stone,
received general assistance three or more times per month. In
fact, the declaratory relief in Stone had precisely the same effect
as an injunction against enforcement of the statewide regulations. As the court of appeals observed, "[I]n the absence of a
stay, Vermont has been giving Goldberg-type hearings to persons within the class whose applications for continued assistance
have been denied, with payments continuing pending the out'48
come of the hearing.
It can be argued that a declaratory judgment is always expected to have the same effect as an injunction and that other
departments of government are expected to obey the "declaratory" mandates of the courts. For example, in Mendoza-Martinez4 9
the government was not really "free" pending appeal to enforce
the deportation statute which had been declared uncon" See note 36 supra & accompanying text, on plaintiff's power to evade the threejudge requirement by asking for declaratory relief alone.
48 528 F.2d at 1088.
49 372 U.S. 144 (1963).

STONE v. PHILBROOK

19761

stitutional. 50 Even if this argument about the general nature of
declaratory relief is rejected, the particular relief in Stone did, in
the language of Mendoza-Martinez, "paralyze totally the operation
of an entire regulatory scheme"5 1 throughout the state of Vermont. Although the order in Stone was in form declaratory
rather than injunctive, it had the "injunctive" effect of requiring
termination of a state's regulation (at least in the absence of a

stay).
In deciding whether the single judge had jurisdiction, the
Stone court should have considered the practical "injunctive" effect of the declaratory relief combined with the class action status
granted plaintiff. Mendoza-Martinez emphasized the perceived
"'non-coercive" nature of the particular declaratory relief there
granted, and strongly indicated that more coercive declaratory
relief was to be treated differently. The Supreme Court's subsequent consideration of declaratory judgments in the context of
three-judge court statutes has been quite summary, and, at least
in Rockefeller,5 2 confused.53

IV.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF

MTM, INC. v. BAXLEy 5 4

Part of the uncertainty surrounding Stone derives, as Judge
Friendly noted, from a collateral source-the recent Supreme
Court decisions reducing the number of cases that may be appealed directly to the Court under section 1253. Until the 1974
term of the Court, the settled view was that if a three-judge court
was convened properly, then direct appeal to the Supreme Court
was available from an order of that court granting or denying an
injunction on any grounds.5 5 Then in Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union5 6 the Supreme Court held that appeal from
50 See D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS 791 (2d ed. 1975); HART AND WECHSLER, supra
note 3, at 968. Mendoza-Martinez could almost certainly have obtained an injunction
against enforcement of the statute, whether from a single-judge or a three-judge court,
on the basis of the declaratory judgment. It is possible others may have been able to do
so as well.
51 372 U.S. at 154.
52 Rockefeller v. Catholic Medical Center, 397 U.S. 820 (1970).

" See Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U.S. 427, 432-33 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
But cf. id. at 429-30 (per curiam). The Court in Mitchell made no distinctions among
kinds of declaratory judgments in relying on Mendoza-Martinez, perhaps because the
Court was not reviewing an order granting declaratory relief whose coercive nature it
could examine. Instead the lower court had denied relief.
54 420 U.S. 799 (1975).
55 See Note, The Three-Judge DistrictCourt: Scope and Procedures Under Section 2281, 77
HARv. L. REV. 299, 311 (1963); cf. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen,
362 U.S. 73 (1960).
56 419 U.S. 90, 94-101 (1974).
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the denial of an injunction for lack of standing lay in the court of
appeals and not in the Supreme Court under section 1253, on
the ground that only an order denying an injunction "required
• . . to be heard and determined by a district court of three
judges" was within the statute. An order denying an injunction
for lack of
that a single judge could enter, such as dismissal
57
standing, was outside the direct appeal statute.
Later in the term in MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 5 8 in which a threejudge court issued an order denying an injunction and dismissing the claim under Younger v. Harris9 because of a pending
state criminal prosecution, the Court, dismissing plaintiff's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, held that section 1253 permitted
the
direct appeal only from three-judge decisions that reached
60
question of the constitutionality of the challenged statute.
In MTM, however, the Court declined to decide whether
three judges were required to dismiss a case under Younger,6 '
thus leaving MTM open to two possible interpretations. First, all
decisions short of rulings on the constitutionality of the statute
or regulation can be made by a single judge, and, as in Gonzalez,
decisions that can be made by one judge are appealable to the
court of appeals even if they are made by three judges; or second, some decisions that can be made only by three judges can
be appealed only to the court of appeals.
Justice White's concurring opinion in MTM stated that the
decision was viable only under the first interpretation. First, he
argued, all orders required to be entered by three judges were
explicitly within the language of section 1253 providing for direct appeal, and therefore only orders that one judge could
57 Gonzalez did not reach the issue whether a decision based on the constitutional

merits of the case is necessary to confer jurisdiction on the Supreme Court under
§ 1253. That question was answered affirmatively in MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U.S. 799
(1975). Thus Gonzalez no longer has independent effect on the § 1253 issue. See notes
58-60 infra & accompanying text.
58 420 U.S. 799 (1975).
59 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
60 420 U.S. at 804. The interpretation of § 1253 in MTM still would further the
primary congressional policy of providing for immediate Supreme Court review
whenever injunctive relief against the operation of a statute or regulation was granted
on constitutional grounds because in all such cases the lower court would reach the
question of the statute's or regulation's constitutionality. Id. at 803-04, (citing Gonzalez
v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90, 98-99 (1974)). Note that for these
purposes, "constitutional grounds" do not include the supremacy clause. See Swift & Co.
v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965) (holding that where supremacy clause is the basis of
the only substantial constitutional challenge in a case, no three-judge court need be
convened, and appeal lies in the court of appeals).
61 420 U.S. at 802 n.7.
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enter were outside the terms of the statute. If a dismissal ordered on any grounds but the constitutional merits of the case
must be appealed to the circuit court, it must be outside the
scope of section 1253, and therefore may be ordered by a single
judge. 62 Second, an appellate procedure that required a threejudge court of appeals to review a three-judge district court's
decision 3 was an "exorbitant expenditure of judicial manpower.

6

In Stone the court's holding would be supported most directly by the first interpretation of MTM, adopted by Justice
White. Under this view a single judge faced with a claim for
injunctive relief on constitutional grounds can still dispose of the
case on any other claim or any other grounds available. If an
order granting declaratory relief can be appealed to the court of
appeals, then a fortiori a single judge could grant such relief as
long as he did not reach the constitutionality of the challenged
statute in an order granting an injunction. 64 If, however, singlejudge jurisdiction and lack of direct appealability are not congruent, as under the second interpretation of MTM, then
whether a single judge has jurisdiction when a plaintiff requests
both injunctive and declaratory relief remains an open question
66
65
to be decided under Mendoza-Martinez and Steffel.
Judge Friendly's opinion in Stone, however, is also consistent
with the second reading of MTM because he considers the result
"clear enough" on the basis of the argument previously outlined
under Mendoza-Martinez and Steffel. 6 7 The terms of the order of
the court of appeals to the single judge to abstain on remand,
however, provide some evidence that Judge Friendly prefers the
first interpretation, and that Mendoza-Martinez and MTM would
allow a single judge to grant declaratory relief even when faced
62

Id. at 805 (White, J., concurring).

63

Id. at 806-07 (White, J., concurring). Of course, given the structure Justice White
proposes, three-judge courts will often make decisions that a single judge could have
made, and judicial manpower will still be wasted.
64This conclusion requires the assumption that a plaintiff will not appeal the denial
of injunctive relief if he receives declaratory relief. See Gunn v. University Comm., 399
U.S. 383, 390 n.6 (1970).
65372 U.S. 144 (1963).
66 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
67Just where all this, and the still more recent decision in MTM, Inc. v. Baxley
. leave traditional notions that under the three-judge statute the power of
an appellate court to consider a case on the merits depends on what kind of
court should have been convened below is a new puzzlement in this nevernever land, as Mr. Justice White pointed out in his concurrence in the case last
cited ....

However, the conclusion for this case seems clear enough.

528 F.2d at 1090 (footnote omitted). See notes 18-31 supra & accompanying text.
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with a claim for injunctive relief. The court issues the order to
abstain without discussing whether abstention by one judge or
three is required. Unless MTM overruled the precedent that a
single judge lacks power to abstain, however, only a three-judge
court would have jurisdiction to abstain because plaintiff Stone
still requested injunctive relief. 68 Therefore, the proper order of
the remand would have been that the single judge request that a
three-judge court be convened, and that the three-judge panel
abstain. If, however, MTM gives a single judge jurisdiction to
enter all orders except those adjudging the constitutionality of
the challenged statute in granting or denying an injunction,
then, as the court in its order in Stone seems to allow, the single
judge has jurisdiction to abstain alone.6 9
CONCLUSION

Starting with Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,"° the courts, in
differentiating declaratory from injunctive relief, have pursued a
course which ultimately will bring them to the question whether
granting declaratory relief on constitutional grounds when injunctive relief is also sought always has the same jurisdictional
requirements as deciding on statutory or collateral grounds cases
in which a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief on constitutional
grounds.
The most persuasive argument against the Mendoza-Martinez
doctrine is that, if the policy behind three-judge courts justifies
maintaining them, then declaratory relief should always be
treated like injunctive relief, at least in a "civilized society" in
which government defendants are expected to obey the courts'
declaratory mandates.7 '
68 See Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715 (1962)

(footnote omitted):
When an application for a statutory three-judge court is addressed to a district
court, the court's inquiry is appropriately limited to determining whether the
constitutional question raised is substantial, whether the complaint at least formally alleges a basis for equitable relief, and whether the case presented
otherwise comes within tne requirements of the three-judge statute. Those
criteria were assuredly met here, and the applicable jurisdictional statute therefore made it impermissible for a single judge to decide the merits of the case,
either by granting or by witholding relief.
The single district judge in the court below had abstained without granting or denying
the injunction.
69
See MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U.S. 799, 805 (1975) (White, J., concurring). This
reading would of course overrule Idlewild.
70 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
"See note 50 supra & accompanying text.
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In the absence of such a statutory scheme, or rather in the
presence of a scheme which by judicial decision accepts Mendoza-Martinez, serious questions remain whether the declaratory
relief exception should be wide enough to allow the single judge
to avoid the three-judge statutes at his discretion, and whether
all declaratory relief should be distinguished from injunctive relief. The opinion in Stone v. Philbrook is consistent with affirmative answers to both of these questions but unfortunately does
not consider them fully. The court never questions, even given
Mendoza-Martinez, which allows plaintiffs to manipulate the
three-judge statutes, whether these statutes are not overly subverted by a system that allows a single judge who favors the
plaintiff's position to avoid them. Further, the court in Stone
never addresses the equivalence of injunctive relief and the
"coercive" declaratory judgment issued by the single trial judge;
in such a case even Mendoza-Martinez raises serious questions
whether a single judge should act. Finally, the court indicates
that MTM, Inc. v. Baxley72 holds the key to what a single judge
may do, implying that he may do anything-including grant declaratory relief on constitutional grounds-short of issuing an
order granting or denying an injunction which passes on the
constitutionality of the challenged statute or regulation. If that
interpretation of MTM proves correct, then only overruling the
Mendoza-Martinez-Rockefeller line of cases will prevent single
judges from considering requests for declaratory judgments on
constitutional grounds, even where the plaintiff also requests
injunctive relief.
72

420 U.S. 799 (1975).

